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Reducing disparities among regions within European countries together with economic
development is the aim of European and national structural policies. In particular, a
European grant contributes to the German governmental program for reducing and equal-
izing regional unemployment. The goal is to bring unemployment down to the national
average by creating new and/or by safeguarding existing jobs, which also contributes to
decreasing national unemployment and to GDP growth.
The distribution of available aid among 271 German labor market regions is considered
as an econometric decision problem with three targets: (1) minimization of unemployment,
(2) maximization of GDP, and (3) equalization of regional unemployment rates, subject
to the budget constraint and some administrative restrictions. To prepare grounds for
optimization, econometric predictions are made for the year 2004 from regional data
1994{2001.
Compared with the previous Discussion Paper 115, the given work contains four new
items:
² The German regional policy is optimized not only with regard to equalizing the
regional unemployment, but also with regard to reducing national unemployment
and GDP growth.
² The source data are extended from a single period of observations 2000-2001 to
yearly data 1994{2001.
² The analysis of past developments is no longer the goal of the model but a means
to make decisions for the future.
² The number of control parameters is reduced to a necessary minimum implemented
in a user interface in form of tables and ¯gures visualizing the topology of optimal
planning.
The model can be regarded as a prototype of decision-aid for designing regional policy
at national and European levels.
Keywords: European Commission, structural fund grants, regional policy, unem-
ployment, equalizing regional unemployment rates, economic growth, optimal planning.
JEL classi¯cation: C33, H25, J68, R00, R15.
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Increasing employment, stimulating economic growth, and reducing disparities among
regions are the objectives of both German and European regional policies. In recent
years multi-billion national and European grants were given to create new and/or to
safeguard existing jobs. First of all it concerns permanent jobs which are most important
in providing welfare and social stability.
In particular, a European grant contributes to the German governmental program for
equalizing regional unemployment by creating new and/or by safeguarding existing jobs
(Deutscher Bundestag 2002, Tetsch et al. 1996), which also contributes to reducing the
general unemployment and to GDP growth.
The equalization of unemployment resembles the stabilization of an airplane. The
stabilizer consumes some energy but is necessary to provide a safe °ight. The equalization
of unemployment takes resources from active labor market policies but prevents from
structural disproportions. A limited grant naturally results in a trend to subsidize ¯rst the
jobs which need less subsidies rather than the jobs which are `expensive' for grant-givers.
Since the amount of aid pro job depends of prevailing regional industries and services,
certain regions are little supported, while others get too much aid. This decreases the
average unemployment but increases the disparity among regions.
The regional unemployment rate is one of most important indicators of socio-econo-
mical equilibrium. Besides, it characterizes the regional governmental performance and
serves as a governmental assistance criterion. Its equalization all over the country is
expected to improve national output and to decrease in°ation pressure (Taylor 1996).
According to Fothergill (2001) and Elhorst (2003), the unemployment disparity among
regions within countries is becoming a source of troubles in the European Union. They
are getting comparable with that among the countries themselves (Elhorst 1995, Taylor
and Bradley 1997, European Commission 1999). The extension of the European Union
to the East, where the economical imbalance is aggravated by transition processes, makes
this problem even more acute.
Compared with the unemployment at national and intra-national levels, the regional
unemployment is relatively little studied. The 3630 page Handbook of Labor Economics
(Ashenfelter and Layard 1986, Ashenfelter and Card 1999) contains nothing on regional
unemployment, and the Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics contains just a half-
relevant chapter on urban unemployment (Crampton 1999). All of this illustrates how far
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the topic is from the mainstream research.
The belief that the nature of regional unemployment is similar to that of unemployment
in general is rather super¯cial. The factors which are thought to explain disparities among
countries (e.g., Phelps 1994, Malinvaud 1994, Bean 1994, OECD 1994, Scarpetta 1996),
like institutions of wage bargaining, social security, retirement, and taxes are not relevant
to regions. Indeed, they di®er between countries but not between regions within countries;
consequently some other factors should exist.
Elhorst (2003) has reviewed 41 empirical studies, where regional unemployment dif-
ferentials are explained with the help of regional data. These models (some are not
implemented in formulas) are classi¯ed as follows:
1. Single equation models (one independent and one dependent variable):
(a) empirical models, mostly with no equations but nevertheless suggesting factors
which might be used as explanatory variables,
(b) the inverse unemployment-vacancy relationship, or the Beveridge curve (e.g.,
Jones and Manning 1992, Holzer 1993),
(c) the cyclical sensitivity model which explains the regional unemployment as a
linear function of the national unemployment; such a model makes sense if
the regional and national unemployment cointegrate in the sense of Engle and
Granger (1987) into an equilibrium con¯guration (e.g., Chapman 1991, Martin
1997, Baddeley et al. 1998),
(d) the amenity model which explains the regional unemployment as a function of
aggregated attractiveness of the regions, for instance, re°ected by the wage-to-
infrastructure-index ratio (e.g., Marston 1985, Montgomery 1993).
2. Implicit models
(a) the migration-based model which explains the regional unemployment by mi-
gration °ows (e.g., Molho 1995, Groenewold 1997),
(b) the NAIRU model (= non-accelerating in°ation rates of unemployment), or the
Phillips and wage-setting curves (e.g., Jones and Hyclak 1989, Payne 1995),
(c) the Blanchard{Katz model (1992) with four equations which links the regional
unemployment rate to labor supply, labor demand, wage-setting, and migration
of both population and ¯rms; a similar study on the regional unemployment
in the European Union is performed by Decressin and Fat¶ as (1995).
3. The accounting identity models which are based on estimating the impact of
a single individual, depending on his identi¯cation either as a local unemployed,
or migrant, in-commuter, or out-commuter, etc. (e.g., Burridge and Gordon 1981,
Gordon 1988, Gordijn and Wissen 1992, Wissen and Ekamper 1995).
4. The simultaneous models with interactions, which take into account the feed-
back of the regional unemployment to the explanatory labor market variables, like
the labor force participation rate, degree of employment and earnings, labor de-
mand, etc. (e.g., Bilger et al. 1991, Blackaby and Manning 1992).1.2. ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICIES 9
As concluded by Elhorst, the models reviewed provide clear-cut trends in the inter-
action between the regional unemployment and other labor market variables. It should
be noted however that these models directly or indirectly assume a kind of labor market
equilibrium, which is a certain idealization. The factors which violate the equilibrium,
like governmental creation of new jobs, are not explicitly taken into account.
1.2 Active labor market policies
Active labor market policies are aimed at reducing unemployment and are implemented in
all developed countries (Fay 1996, Heckman et al. 1999, Martin 2000, Steiner and Hagen
2002). They fall into three main schemes.
1. Job creation is o®ering subsidies to wages mainly for short-running projects in non-
pro¯t organizations. These jobs are often given to former long-term unemployed
and are usually restricted to terms of about one year.
2. Structural adjustments is also o®ering wage subsidies but with other goals and in a
closer collaboration with private ¯rms. The subsidies are aimed at integrating the
employees into the main activities and are given for terms of about three years.
3. Public training consists of educational measures paid by the employment o±ce.
They are aimed at improving the chances for employment and increasing the em-
ployment stability.
According to Bundesanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit (2003b), during the period of 1990{2002 only
in East Germany 6.5 Mio workers, which is about the number of active employees, were
involved in these programs with the overall budget of 138 billion EURO. Expenditures of
this size require systematic analysis of their e®ects.
Microeconomic studies are based on comparisons between groups of participants and
groups of non-participants; for surveys see Hagen and Steiner (2000) and Hujer and
Caliendo (2001). As follows from these surveys, there is no clear evidence of either positive,
or negative e®ects of the German active labor market policies on the future prospects of
the participants. This inde¯niteness has been also con¯rmed by the recent report based
on large administrative data (Hujer et al. 2003).
Hagen (2003) criticizes the microeconomic approach for its stable unit treatment value
assumption (Rubin 1980). In the given context it means that the control groups of non-
participants are not a®ected by the programs. Since the programs are very extensive,
their indirect e®ects on the non-participants are likely to be quite signi¯cant. It implies
a violation of the basic assumption, making questionable their rersults.
The macroeconomic approach, on the contrary, assumes simultaneity and reciprocal
in°uence of all factors within the economy. Several authors selected it as more appropriate
for estimating the indirect and net e®ects of active labor market policies (Heckman et al.
1999). However, macroeconomic studies based on regional data reveal no unambiguous
trends either (BÄ uttner and Pray 1998, Steiner et al. 1998, Hagen and Steiner 2000, Schmid
et al. 2001, Blien et al. 2002, Fertig et al. 2002, Hagen 2003).
In the most recent study Hagen (2003) applied three macroeconomic approaches to
East German regional data:10 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
² an augmented matching function approach which evaluates the e®ects of the active
labor market policies on regional matching e±ciency,
² a reduced-form approach based on the Beveridge curve which assesses the e®ects
on the regional job seeker rate, including both unemployed and participants in the
active labor market policies,
² a regional labor demand approach.
The main ¯ndings were a certain negative e®ect of job creation and no signi¯cant e®ect
of structural adjustments and of public training on the regional employment. In spite of
having used alternative approaches, a number of questions remained open.
It should be noticed that both micro- and macro- modelling do not take account of
such general factors as accelerating technological transformations with new requirements
to the employees, support of Eastern Europe and globalization which channelled ¯nancial
°ows out of developed countries and moved some industries and services to the Third
World, and the recession which started in Asia in the mid-1990s and then expanded to
the West. Their negative implications can mask the positive e®ect of the active labor
market policies, without which the labor market situation might become much worse.
1.3 Regional policy and optimization
The point left with little attention is the quality of realizing governmental programs. Ac-
cording to Lechner and Smith (2003), \caseworkers do not do a very good job of allocating
their unemployed clients to the subprograms so as to maximize their subsequent employ-
ment prospects." It can imply that not the policies intended but their implementation is
responsible for their low e±ciency reported in empirical studies. In a market economy,
underused possibilities and non-optimal behavior often cause redistributions and struc-
tural shifts which can lead away from the results expected. For instance, an imbalanced
job creation causes migrations which reduce local e®ects.
Lechner and his colleagues (2003) took part in developing a statistical expert system
which customizes the o®er for each particular unemployed client. This may be the only
instance of any kind of optimization approach in the vast research on active labor market
policies. (In a personal communication Lechner was somewhat surprised to learn about my
optimization interpretation of his work. Elhorst after having compiled a comprehensive
survey was not aware of any optimization approach.)
Such a general neglect of optimization methods is amazing in two respects. The role
which optimization plays in the modern economy is hard to overestimate (Samuelson
1971). As far as it concerns market relations, the (quasi) optimization is guided by `the
invisible hand', Adam Smith's (1776) metaphor for competition. This, however, is not the
case in the public sector with central planning and budget governmental programs. Con-
sequently, optimization should be primarily applied in the public sector and particularly
in the domain discussed.
On the other hand, almost all quantitative studies on unemployment are essentially
econometrical. Yet the founders of econometrics, the ¯rst winners of the Nobel Prize in
economics (1969) Jan Tinbergen and Ragnar Frisch always linked econometrics to opti-
mization. Among other things, both Tinbergen and Frisch were faced to unemployment1.4. ECONOMETRIC DECISION MODELS 11
problems and in the 1950s made pioneering contributions to econometric optimization
models (Frisch 1963, Tinbergen 1952, 1956, see also Johansen 1974); this topic was se-
lected by Frisch for his Nobel Address (1970). Consequently, there exist also historical
prerequisites for interactions between unemployment studies, econometrics, and optimiza-
tion.
In econometric optimization models the desired is represented by the objective func-
tion and the feasible by econometric equations which restrict economic indices to certain
allowed combinations. Their interaction results in the optimal decision. In a sense, opti-
mization adds an active element, the choice, to descriptive econometric models, making
the next step in controlling the situation.
1.4 Econometric decision models
Just this philosophy was developed by R. Frisch and J. Tinbergen. For the ¯rst time,
the term `decision model' (= econometric optimization model) was used in Frisch's work
for the United Nations Economic and Employment Commission in 1949 (Bjerkholt and
Str¿m 2002). This work was published as late as in 1955 and the idea of decision models
became popular owing to Tinbergen's On the Theory of Economic Policy (1952) where
he acknowledged Frisch's priority. Both Tinbergen and Frisch strongly promoted the
so-called quadratic-linear approach with a quadratic objective function maximized or
minimized subject to linear constraints.
The bottle-neck was the objective function, and Frisch (1957, 1971) suggested the
Multiplex Method to construct it from interviews. In the mid-1950s he conducted \well
planned interviews" with the Norwegian Minister of Finance Trygve Bratteli who became
Prime Minister for the Labour Party in the early 1970s. Later this approach was ten-
tatively used by Van Eijk and Sandee (1959), Chossudovsky (1972a{b), Van der Geest
(1977), Merkies and Nijman (1983), Van Daal and Merkies (1984), Merkies and Hofkies
(1991), HÄ usges and Gruber (1991), and Medelin, Aspedale and Pachio (1994).
Frisch intended objective functions for decision models, but these plans had few suc-
cessors. Frisch's ideas were not really elaborated but only discussed by Hallet and Rees
(1983), Rustem and Velupillai (1984), Hughes Hallet (1991), and some others. In par-
ticular, Oswald (1985) explained perspectives of using econometric decision models for
the wage formation. Recovering objective functions of trade union leaders and of leaders
of employer's associations were supposed to imply the tradeo® between wage level and
unemployment.
Tinbergen payed a considerable attention to econometric decision models but was
inclined to derive the objective function from the formulation of the problem rather than
from interviews (Kol and de Wolf 1993). Many of his objective functions are linear,
but some are quadratic. It is the case of the model with ¯xed targets (= the ideal
combination of variables), where the distance to the given point is minimized (Tinbergen
1956).1 Tinbergen's approach was further developed by Theil (1964), Fox et al. (1966),
Chow (1975) and other leading economists.
Tinbergen's view at econometric decision models was `more objectivistic' than that
1Strictly speaking, it is di±cult to avoid subjectivity even here. The distance in the econometric
space is ill-de¯ned. Axes are measured in di®erent units like percent, absolute ¯gures, dollar, or EURO.
Determining their substitution rates brings the problem back to Frisch's interviews.12 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
of Frisch. Deriving objective functions from sources other than interviews looked more
impartial and `scienti¯c'. Sharing this standpoint, several authors revealed objective func-
tions from panel data, in particular from tradeo®s observed. These studies are however
not quite relevant to proper decision models, since they are not aimed at ¯nding decisions
but operate on the ones already made (like consumer choices). Moreover, a `decision' is
regarded as a kind of equilibrium-based optimization which is not exactly the subject of
decision models. For a survey of related works see Dantzing at al. (1989a{b) where the
objective function of the U.S. economy is constructed.
Tinbergen and his successors often considered abstract objective functions for ana-
lytical purposes, without numerically determining their coe±cients. The linear-quadratic
decision model which seemed quite operational was rather a theoretical framework. Per-
sistent Frisch's e®orts to develop methods for constructing objective functions were not
more than practice-oriented. As concluded by Bjerkholt and Str¿m (2002), \Frisch left
this ¯eld of interest with work undone".
Gruber (2002) remembers that in 1965, after 35 years of existence of the Econometric
Society and 16 years after the idea of econometric decision models had been introduced,
he found no operational method for constructing objective functions. In both American
and German dissertations Gruber (1965, 1967) had to use a heuristic quadratic objective
function with no cross-products and roughly estimated coe±cients of squared variables.
In subsequent years the situation did not improve much (Gruber 1979) and he tried
to animate studies in econometric decision models by having organized four international
conferences (Gruber 1983, 1991; Tangian and Gruber 1997, 2002). Interesting experiments
were reported by Merkies; for the self-survey see Merkies (2002). A special method for
constructing quadratic and additive objective functions was developed by Tangian (2001{
2003a) and applied by Hilles and Tangian (2002), Schwarm (2002), and Teibach (2002).
Dealing with econometric decision models turned out to be more complex than initially
expected. Compared with purely econometric models, they include an additional element,
the objective function, and result in optimization problems to be solved. Unlike statistical
methods applicable to almost all data sets, optimization techniques are not that universal.
Respectively, econometric models are generally solvable but econometric decision models
are not.
This makes building a decision model a kind of art. It assumes the knowledge of the
subject domain. Selecting important factors, sorting out secondary ones, and formalizing
ill-de¯ned notions, relations, and preferences by variables, equalities, inequalities, and
objective functions requires intuition and inventiveness. Con¯guring sophisticated opti-
mization methods into a consistent model needs mathematical skills. Finally, the whole
construct must be mathematically manageable and computable.
These claims explain why purely econometric models prevail over their optimization
extensions. Another cause is the situation in mathematics and computer science. Statis-
tics as a mathematical discipline was well developed before the invention of computers,
and statistical packages became available already in the 1960{1970s. Optimization, or
mathematical programming, was developed mainly after the Second World War just to
meet new technical endeavors. Accordingly, optimization software was delayed, especially
in the user-friendliness, by at least 20 years.
The last but not least cause of disregarding decision models in economics is the speci-
¯city of scholarly work itself. Statistics meets its habitual tasks of description, classi-
¯cation, analysis, and systematization. Decision making belongs to the competence of1.5. ABOUT THE GIVEN WORK 13
engineers, managers, and policy makers. So a psychological factor is also present.
Summing up what has been said, econometric decision models are still in their infancy.
Due to a delay in their development and other di±culties, they are much less used by
scholars than purely econometric models. The latter are often su±cient as explaining the
dependence of economic variables and thereby restricting the choice of economic policies
to feasible ones. However, the policies restricted that way are still too numerous to make
the ¯nal selection. For this purpose an operational objective function, which distinguishes
a decision model, is required.
In particularly it is the case of active labor market policies. Econometric studies
analyze their e®ects: short- and long-term employment, labor demand, migration, future
prospects of participants, etc. It is recognized that labor market policies are implemented
administratively with little use of optimization methods. Therefore, there is a hope that
developing dedicated decision models can optimize them and improve their performance.
1.5 About the given work
At present Germany is divided into 271 labor market regions, 204 in West Germany,
and 67 in East Germany. The European employment policy restricts the regions to be
supported to 23.4% of the total population (Crome and Schwengler 2000, Hassold and
Jung 2000). Taking into account economic di±culties in East Germany, all its regions are
eligible, and the budget is separate for West and East Germany. During the control period
1994{2001 all eligible regions received yearly about 2.0{2.8 billion EUR; West Germany
received about 250{280 Mio, about 1/9, and East Germany | 2.0{2.5.1 Mio, 8/9 of the
total. It should be mentioned that some West German regions were eligible for a few
years or for one year only, and some regions were not eligible at all. It implies fewer data
on West Germany and blanks in corresponding data tables.
In the given paper we develop an econometric decision model for redistributing the
aid among eligible regions in East and West Germany. The optimization is performed
to increase in the employment and GDP as well as to equalize regional unemployment,
according to the goals of European and national structural policies. The model operates on
some source data transformed to a certain form and consists of three blocks: econometric
prediction, optimization, and analysis. The modelling falls into the following steps.
² Collecting regional data
These data are available from Bundesamt fÄ ur Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle
(2003), Bundesanstalt fÄ ur Arbeit (2003a), and Statistisches Bundesamt (2003).
² Explaining regional indices as functions in year and regional subsidies
E®ects of active labor market policies on the regional indices, in particular on un-
employment, have been outlined in Section 1.2. As revealed by Hagen (2003) and
several other authors, the regional unemployment rates depend on the subsidies
granted to the regions. For our study, we use the simplest linear estimation directly
derived from the available statistical ¯gures.
² Operationalizing the target variables
The econometric regional prediction of unemployment and the increase in GDP
imply simple linear expressions for the national unemployment rate and the GDP14 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
gain. The unemployment disparity among regions is de¯ned to be the variance of
regional unemployment rates.
The criterion of least variance, not always explicitly, is used in models of market
stabilization (Gruber 1965, 1967), general economic stabilization (Pindyck 1973,
Friedman 1975), and optimal control (Chow 1975, Blanchard and Fischer 1989).
² Expressing the target variables in regional subsidies
The linear econometric equations, having been substituted into linear expressions for
national unemployment or GDP gain, and in the quadratic expression for the vari-
ance, do not a®ect their (polynomial) degree. This means that the ¯rst two target
variables, having been expressed in the regional subsidies, remain linear functions,
and the third target variable, the variance, remains quadratic.
² Building a decision model
It remains to impose the total budget constraint and to restrict the aid to the eligible
regions. The objective function considered is a weighted sum of the target variables,
with the target weights re°ecting their importance. The problem operationalized
that way is linear-quadratic, with a quadratic objective function minimized subject
to a linear budget constraint and eligibility restrictions.
² Solving the optimization problem
The linearly restricted quadratic programming problem is implemented in a com-
puter program written in the MATLAB programming environment.
² User interface to analyze optimal solutions
The optimization is performed for West Germany and East Germany with separate
budgets, as well as for whole Germany with a joint budget. Some tabular and
graphical representations are suggested to facilitate the work with the model (=
user interface), in particular, to trace the practical e®ect of assigning target weights.
Chapter 2, \Model", contains rigorous assumptions and mathematical propositions.
The `motor' of the model is the variance operator which reduces computing the variance
to a vector/matrix multiplication, separates linear and quadratic operations, and thereby
makes the optimization problem solvable.
Chapter 3, \Results", explains the model output represented by ¯gures and tables.
Then we comment on the optimal aid distribution among the eligible regions.
The last chapter \Conclusion" outlines perspectives for further developments and re-
capitulates the main results of the paper.Chapter 2
Model
2.1 Empirical data 1994{2001
For our model, we transform the source data 1994{2001 on 271 German labour market
regions. For each region, we de¯ne four independent variables, meaning that no variable
can be expressed in others. The independence is important to avoid contradictions in
forecasts-2004. For de¯nitions and sample see Table 2.1. Blank spaces mean that the
region received no aid this year.
The productivity re°ects the competitive standing of the region. Supporting produc-
tive regions implies developing industries and services with an important contribution to
GDP.
The number of net employed and of net unemployed are the employment trends free
from external interventions in the form of creating new or safeguarding existing jobs.
The aid pro job is in fact the cost of one job for grant givers. Subsidizing the regions
where this cost is low implies a high employment e®ect of the grant, because more jobs
can be subsidized for the same aid. On the other hand, `cheap' jobs, requiring little invest-
ments, are suspected to emerge in low productive branches. Our investigation disproves
this statement.
2.2 Econometric forecast for 2004
For each region, the four regional variables are regarded as functions of time. They
are predicted for 2004 by the common linear regression techniques. More speci¯cally,
the regional variables are expressed in the independent variable \Year" which indirectly
incorporates numerous in°uential factors. The linearity assumption means the ¯rst-order
approximation of the unknown function. This general interpretation follows from the
Taylor expansion of a function up to the ¯rst term: It is the ¯rst-order approximation of
the function, and it is linear in the argument increment.
The forecast is made whenever the data on the region are available, also for the regions
which received the aid irregularly. East German regions received the aid every year, the
related data are most complete, and the related forecast is therefore most reliable.
The prediction results for all 271 regions are collected in the ¯rst section of Table 3.1,
which displays the model output. It contains some unrealistic predictions for 2004 like
negative or extremely high expenditures pro subsidized job. This is explained by large
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Table 2.1: Source data and independent regional variables 1994{2001
Regional variable Regional source data Units
GDP Mio EUR
Number of employed Ths
Number of unemployed Ths
Aid granted (to the region) Mio EUR
Number of permanent jobs subsidized
(created and safeguarded) Ths
Productivity = GDP
Number of employed Ths EUR/employee
Net employed = Number of employed
¡ Number of permanent jobs subsidized Ths
Net unemployed = Number of unemployed
+ Number of permanent jobs subsidized Ths
Aid pro job = Aid granted
Number of permanent jobs subsidized Ths EUR/job
Sample source data 1994 and their transformation into regional variables



























Ths ThsMio.EURMio.EUR Ths. Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR
1Husum 75:30 4:00 2895 0:560 0:030 75:27 4:03 38:4 18:67
2Heide 54:70 4:00 2308 54:70 4:00 42:2
3Itzehoe 53:50 4:30 2791 0:800 0:130 53:37 4:43 52:2 6:15
4Flensburg 128:90 10:60 5411 11:350 0:234 128:67 10:83 42:0 48:50
5LÄ ubeck 197:80 16:70 8277 0:030 0:003 197:80 16:70 41:8 10:00
6Kiel 336:10 29:40 15111 0:220 0:039 336:06 29:44 45:0 5:64
7Ratzeburg 56:80 4:80 2514 0:570 0:165 56:63 4:96 44:3 3:45
8Hamburg 1388:40 97:20 79859 1388:40 97:20 57:5
9Braunschweig 220:50 23:90 10283 220:50 23:90 46:6
10Salzgitter 57:90 7:60 2901 57:90 7:60 50:1
.................................................................................................
random leaps of yearly indices which cause rather steep regression lines. Since the tar-
get year 2004 is distant from the period of observations 1994{2001 these lines have an
additional room to go out of reasonable limits.
These unrealistic predictions are corrected by the technique of constrained forecast.
It replaces the prediction outlier by the corresponding maximal or minimal observation
during the control period. The constrained forecast is given in the second section of Table
3.1. The forecast for Productivity is not constrained, because the development of the
regional productivity is not that random and is quasi-linear in all the regions.
The section \Constrained forecast" in Table 3.1 contains additionally the vector n of
predicted regional net unemployment rates. It is directly derived from the regional ¯gures2.2. ECONOMETRIC FORECAST FOR 2004 17
Table 2.2: Estimates derived from the constrained forecast 2004
VectorName Expressions in predicted ¯gures Units
u Net
unemployed =Net unemployed Ths
n Net
unemployment
rate 2004 = Net unemployed
Net employed + Net unemployed ¢ 100 %
Estimated e±ciency of 1 Mio EUR Aid in 2004
j Additional
jobs = 1
Aid pro job Ths
g Gain
in GDP =Productivity ¢ Additional jobs
= Productivity
Aid pro job Mio EUR
d Decrement in
unemployment
rate = Additional jobs
Net employed + Net unemployed ¢ 100%
= 100
Aid pro job ¢ (Net employed + Net unemployed) %
for net employment and unemployment. Generally, the forecast vectors with regional
¯gures used further by the model are denoted by boldface letters. It is also the case of
the vector u with the number of unemployed predicted in the regions.
The constraint forecast for 2004 allows to estimate the e®ect of aid to each region.
The e®ect reduced to the reference aid of one Mio EUR is considered in three domains
(for rigorous de¯nitions see Table 2.2):
² Additional jobs, that is, we estimate how many additional jobs in the region
can be subsidized in 2004 with one Mio EUR. These estimates are collected into
the 271-vector j (= jobs) which will be considered while minimizing the national
unemployment. Since the regional variables `Aid pro job' are in Ths EUR, and
the reference aid is one Mio EUR, the estimates `Additional jobs' are automatically
converted into Ths.
² GDP gain, that is, we estimate the gain in GDP due to the additional jobs under
the expected regional productivity. These estimates are collected into the 271-vector
g (= GDP) which will be considered while maximizing GDP. Since the regional vari-
ables `Additional jobs' are in Ths, and `Productivity' are in Ths EUR pro employee,
the estimates `GDP gain' are automatically converted into Mio EUR.
² Decrement in unemployment rate, that is, we estimate the decrement in the re-
gional unemployment rates due to the additional jobs. These estimates are collected
into the 271-vector d (= decrement), which will be considered while equalizing the
regional unemployment. Since all the incoming ¯gures for estimating `Decrement in
unemployment rate' are given in Ths, only the multiplication by 100% is required.18 CHAPTER 2. MODEL
2.3 Target variables
De¯ne three target variables (= partial criteria): the national increase in employment,
the GDP gain, and the measure of disparity among regional unemployment rates. For
this purpose introduce the following notation.
x the (unknown) 271-vector of the aid to the regions in 2004, in Mio EUR,
j
0x the total additional number of jobs in 2004 due to the aid x; here 0 denotes the
operation of vector/matrix transpose, and j
0x is the scalar product of two vectors,
g0x the additional GDP, in Mio EUR, due to the aid x,
n ¡ Dx the vector of regional (`gross') unemployment rates, in %, which results from
the decrement Dx due to aid x in the net unemployment n; here D = diagd is the
diagonal matrix with the elements of vector d on its main diagonal.
De¯ne the measure of regional unemployment disparity to be the variance of regional
unemployment rates.
Theorem 1 (Variance operator)
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1 0 ::: 0 0
0 1 ::: 0 0
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The variance matrix is symmetric and idempotent, that is,
V
0 = V
V V = V :
Theorem 2 (Unemployment disparity among regions)
The variance of the `gross' unemployment rates of m regions after they have received aid
x is as follows
1
m ¡ 1






0DV Dx ¡ 2n




Proof. Substitute y = n ¡ Dx into (2.1) and derive:
1
m ¡ 1




(V n ¡ V Dx)








0DV )(V n ¡ V Dx)






0V n ¡ x
0DV n ¡ n









0DV Dx ¡ 2n
0V Dx + n
0V n
´
:2.4. OPTIMAL REGIONAL POLICY 19
Thus the three target variables are linear or quadratic functions in aid x with the coe±-
cients estimated econometrically from empirical data, see Table 2.3.
Table 2.3: Target variables










x0DV Dx ¡ 2n0V Dx + n0V n
´
%2
2.4 Optimal regional policy
On the one hand, we wish to increase the employment and GDP. On the other hand, we
wish to reduce the disparity among regional unemployment rates. These intentions are
implemented in the following proposition.
Theorem 3 (Optimization of regional policy)
Given total budget B, list of the regions eligible to receive the aid, and importance ratio of
three target variables a : b : c, then the optimal aid distribution x = fxrg is the solution
to the problem




xr · B (budget constraint)
0 · Jx · u (fewer jobs than unemployed in the region)
xr = 0 for non-eligible regions r ;
where J = diagj is the diagonal matrix with elements of vector j on its main diagonal.
Taking into account the expressions from Table 2.3, we obtain a quadratic programming
problem with the objective function









0V D + aj + bg
´0
x
to be maximized subject to linear equality and inequality constraints (the constant ¡cn0V n
plays no role in the maximization and is omitted). Its Hessian DV D is symmetric
implying the problem solvability.
Putting all the weights a;b;c but one equal to 0, we reduce the problem (2.2) to three
one-target problems. Their solutions are given in the last two sections of Table 3.1.20 CHAPTER 2. MODEL
2.5 Normalizing targets and their weights
The values of the target weights a;b;c other than 1 and 0 are misleading because of
di®erent ranges of the targets:
t1; `Additional jobs', varies from 50 to 500 Ths,
t2; `GDP gain', varies from 6 to 17 Bio EUR, and
t3; `Variance of regional unemployment', varies from 3 to 40%2.
Contrary to intuition, equal target weights a = b = c imply no equal priorities but the
absolute predominance of target t2 and neglect of targets t1 and t3. In order to take
target t3 into consideration, its weight c must be disproportionately large, and the weight
b of t2 very small, at the limit of computer discrimination. To avoid such situations, we










The extreme values of the target variables are obtained from solving three one-target
problems as has been described in the previous section, see Table 3.2.
Normalizing target variables does not a®ect the optimization, but just rearranges the
space of decision parameters. In fact we only insert some factors between target variables
and their weights a;b;c which restore the intuitive meaning of the latter. On the other
hand, we gain in the computational accuracy.
From now on we refer to normalized weights of target variables. In particular, the
target weight ratio 2 : 1 : 7 in the fourth optimization problem on East Germany is
speci¯ed for normalized target variables.Chapter 3
Results
3.1 One-target optimization
Table 3.1 contains solutions to 12 optimization problems. The e®ect of optimal aid distri-
bution on unemployment, GDP, and regional unemployment equalization are presented
in Table 3.2 and Figures 3.1{3.2. The sections of Table 3.2 in a small font are optional
and are derived for completeness from the main solutions shown by the full-sized font.
Four problems concern West Germany with a separate budget. The solutions are
given in the next to last section of Table 3.1, rows 1{204. The e®ect on the regional
unemployment is shown by blue bars in four plots of Figure 3.1. (All further ¯gures
related to West Germany are also in blue.) The optimization summary is put in the
upper-left section of Table 3.2.
Four problems concern East Germany, also with a separate budget. The solutions are
given in the remaining rows 205{271. They are illustrated with red bars in four plots of
Figure 3.1. (All further ¯gures related to East Germany are also in red.) The optimization
summary is given in the middle-left section of Table 3.2.
Finally, four problems concern Germany as a whole with a joint budget. The solutions
occupy the whole last section of Table 3.1. They are illustrated with whole plots in Figure
3.1, all in green, as well as further ¯gures related to whole Germany. The optimization
summary is given in the bottom-right section of Table 3.2.
For instance, consider East Germany. Its separate budget B = 1653:38 Mio EUR
for 2004 is indicated at the foot of Tables 3.1 and 3.2. The budget is predicted from
years 1994{2001, when it gradually decreased. All the m = 67 East German regions were
eligible to receive the aid, which we accept for the year 2004 in (2.2). In case of West
Germany the list of eligible regions varied from year to year, and we accept the most
recent one dated 2001.
The predicted net regional unemployment rates (with no aid) are shown in Figure 3.1
by the stair contour, the same in all four plots. The colored bars show the unemployment
rates reduced due to the optimal aid received. The residual white gaps between the stair
contour and colored bars depict the proper e®ect of the aid.
² The ¯rst model with the target weight ratio a : b : c = 1 : 0 : 0 actually reduces the
consideration to the ¯rst target, Maximal employment. Respectively, the model



















Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
1Husum 78:03 7:44 51:5 8:54 77:22 6:84 8:14 8:54 0:117 6:0 0:14
2Heide 57:79 7:14 54:8 ¡40:08 57:30 6:37 10:00 1:76 0:567 31:1 0:89
3Itzehoe 57:19 6:67 70:8 6:18 56:30 5:95 9:56 6:15 0:162 11:5 0:26
4Flensburg 131:75 13:99 47:8 ¡19:32 131:46 13:99 9:62 2:57 0:389 18:6 0:27 35:97 35:97 3:60 9:22 35:97 35:97 14:14
5LÄ ubeck 197:01 25:75 52:2 3:19 197:01 22:76 10:35 3:19 0:314 16:4 0:14 22:23 34:83 4:41 16:89 72:52 72:52 37:81
6Kiel 342:91 35:67 54:6 12:15 342:91 35:67 9:42 12:15 0:082 4:5 0:02
7Ratzeburg 62:86 7:94 53:5 3:47 61:10 7:08 10:38 3:45 0:289 15:5 0:42
8Hamburg 1454:86 117:69 69:8 46:851444:50 117:69 7:53 46:67 0:021 1:5 0:00
9Braunschweig 222:59 27:55 53:8 ¡5:04 222:59 27:55 11:01 3:50 0:286 15:4 0:11 6:24 21:39 96:42 96:42 52:66
10Salzgitter 59:56 6:93 60:7 6:60 59:36 6:93 10:45 6:01 0:166 10:1 0:25 6:83 6:06 41:62 41:62 1:34
11Wolfsburg 153:69 12:16 82:7 ¡47:63 149:70 12:76 7:85 7:32 0:137 11:3 0:08
12GÄ ottingen 124:44 17:66 49:0 2:75 124:44 17:34 12:23 2:75 0:364 17:8 0:26 47:61 47:61 13:72 19:08 47:61 47:61 23:69
13Goslar 63:92 10:49 53:6 8:39 65:90 9:91 13:07 8:39 0:119 6:4 0:16 22:63 15:51 4:79
14Helmstedt 28:45 6:11 68:2 ¡18:46 28:45 6:11 17:69 1:56 0:641 43:7 1:85 9:54 9:54 5:43 5:79 9:54 9:54 3:98 5:13
15Einbeck 58:73 10:46 47:7 ¡1:52 58:73 10:46 15:12 2:65 0:377 18:0 0:54 27:76 27:76 13:01 14:32 27:76 27:76 7:43 13:17
16Osterode 34:69 7:02 53:8 17:35 35:36 7:02 16:57 17:35 0:058 3:1 0:14 49:50 32:44 16:38 9:41
17Hannover 606:14 55:84 56:1 605:40 55:84 8:44
18Sulingen 87:19 7:50 48:8 ¡3:05 83:20 7:50 8:27 2:33 0:429 20:9 0:47
19Hameln 68:28 10:40 53:9 29:94 68:28 10:24 13:04 29:94 0:033 1:8 0:04
20Hildesheim 122:01 14:08 48:9 18:93 122:01 14:08 10:35 12:83 0:078 3:8 0:06
21Holzminden 31:18 3:99 49:9 14:88 31:72 3:99 11:18 14:88 0:067 3:4 0:19 10:66 2:31
22Nienburg 49:07 4:94 60:6 13:97 49:07 4:94 9:14 13:97 0:072 4:3 0:13
23Stadthagen 61:20 6:75 49:7 12:01 60:20 6:75 10:08 3:28 0:305 15:2 0:46
24Celle 70:17 11:10 55:5 7:74 70:17 9:95 12:42 7:74 0:129 7:2 0:16 18:31 12:54 76:97 3:51
25LÄ uneburg 70:70 9:80 47:1 1:58 68:71 8:94 11:51 3:62 0:277 13:0 0:36 8:87 10:13 32:32 32:32 8:31
26Zeven 68:11 6:02 49:5 65:68 67:20 6:02 8:22 28:67 0:035 1:7 0:05
27Soltau 63:21 6:20 48:7 14:38 63:21 5:71 8:29 14:38 0:070 3:4 0:10
28Stade 75:54 7:05 61:6 10:05 73:60 7:05 8:75 10:00 0:100 6:2 0:12
29Uelzen 58:02 9:66 49:2 4:64 58:02 8:74 13:09 4:64 0:216 10:6 0:32 14:40 14:72 40:55 40:55 3:94 11:42
30Verden 57:15 4:41 55:3 2:74 56:10 4:41 7:29 2:73 0:367 20:3 0:61
31Emden 106:69 13:72 50:5 29:34 103:40 13:67 11:68 29:34 0:034 1:7 0:03
32Westerstede 48:72 5:54 47:0 33:64 47:16 5:39 10:25 32:50 0:031 1:4 0:06
33Oldenburg 145:06 14:42 50:5 ¡0:62 139:58 14:20 9:23 2:94 0:341 17:2 0:22 41:68 41:68 1:46 7:76 41:68 41:68 14:28




























Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
35Wilhelmshaven 104:49 13:57 49:9 10:50 104:49 13:57 11:49 10:50 0:095 4:8 0:08
36Cloppenburg 65:61 6:36 49:8 12:02 62:00 6:36 9:30 12:02 0:083 4:1 0:12
37Lingen 140:00 12:32 60:1 20:97 134:90 12:32 8:37 20:97 0:048 2:9 0:03
38Nordhorn 57:29 4:43 47:3 25:98 55:07 4:43 7:45 25:98 0:038 1:8 0:06
39Leer 58:37 8:96 51:6 22:88 56:61 8:96 13:66 22:88 0:044 2:3 0:07 19:73
40Vechta 69:67 3:81 51:4 ¡13:37 65:30 3:81 5:51 15:32 0:065 3:4 0:09
41Nordenham 34:81 4:25 67:1 23:11 34:81 4:25 10:89 23:11 0:043 2:9 0:11 4:47
42Bremen 387:92 43:47 60:7 10:85 387:92 43:47 10:08 10:85 0:092 5:6 0:02
43Bremerhaven 123:89 20:56 49:7 14:60 124:10 20:06 13:91 14:60 0:068 3:4 0:05
44HÄ exter 63:05 6:15 46:4 3:37 62:90 6:15 8:91 3:81 0:262 12:2 0:38
45DÄ usseldorf 884:06 58:46 75:0 863:90 58:46 6:34
46Duisburg 495:21 63:33 51:7 11:43 484:73 63:33 11:56 11:43 0:087 4:5 0:02
47Essen 390:46 37:81 60:1 ¡24:95 384:70 37:81 8:95 6:87 0:146 8:7 0:03
48Krefeld 121:00 12:16 59:5 42:33 120:50 12:16 9:17 26:60 0:038 2:2 0:03
49Viersen 124:93 11:48 54:2 119:50 11:48 8:76
50MÄ onchengladbach 124:87 14:25 53:4 1:36 122:79 14:25 10:40 1:36 0:738 39:4 0:54 19:31 19:31 4:38 8:62 19:31 19:31 11:92
51Heinsberg 86:86 11:13 47:4 3:81 84:16 11:13 11:68 3:81 0:262 12:4 0:28 11:10 12:77 42:42 42:42 11:61
52Wuppertal 247:30 23:47 56:5 247:20 23:47 8:67
53Schwelm 142:68 14:55 51:7 6:80 141:20 14:55 9:34 6:80 0:147 7:6 0:09
54Remscheid 60:45 5:07 52:3 61:10 5:07 7:66
55Kleve 126:80 11:85 50:5 63:12 120:30 11:85 8:97 25:76 0:039 2:0 0:03
56Aachen 279:99 26:03 53:3 8:58 267:60 26:03 8:86 8:54 0:117 6:2 0:04
57KÄ oln 929:21 79:07 63:9 896:20 79:07 8:11
58Leverkusen 84:91 7:30 74:7 84:90 7:30 7:92
59Bonn 430:73 29:58 51:1 412:60 28:76 6:52
60DÄ uren 111:76 10:67 54:1 34:52 108:00 10:67 8:99 34:35 0:029 1:6 0:02
61Euskirchen 75:18 6:28 49:7 71:80 5:90 7:59
62Gummersbach 132:33 11:24 52:7 125:90 11:24 8:20
63Gelsenkirchen 453:69 81:31 48:1 7:40 450:28 77:49 14:68 7:40 0:135 6:5 0:03 353:87
64MÄ unster 397:85 26:21 51:0 ¡23:44 381:70 26:21 6:43 3:55 0:282 14:4 0:07
65Borken 179:88 11:46 49:5 170:50 11:46 6:30
66Steinfurt 190:74 14:07 47:1 ¡58:92 183:80 14:07 7:11 14:21 0:070 3:3 0:04
67Bielefeld 308:53 29:57 53:6 303:40 29:57 8:88


















Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
69Detmold 154:13 16:27 53:5 20:10 154:10 15:46 9:12 20:00 0:050 2:7 0:03
70Minden 158:79 13:05 52:2 156:10 13:05 7:71
71Paderborn 148:50 12:36 50:2 139:30 12:36 8:15
72Bochum 200:66 20:93 62:0 27:72 195:80 20:93 9:66 24:91 0:040 2:5 0:02
73Dortmund 500:22 74:68 53:8 10:35 499:36 74:68 13:01 10:35 0:097 5:2 0:02
74Hagen 97:95 10:17 56:0 105:38 98:60 10:17 9:35 32:00 0:031 1:8 0:03
75LÄ udenscheid 217:14 16:27 53:8 212:80 16:58 7:23
76Meschede 137:22 9:86 50:0 134:70 9:86 6:82
77Siegen 151:65 9:87 54:1 148:30 9:87 6:24
78Olpe 69:05 4:32 53:6 66:30 4:32 6:11
79Soest 145:63 13:11 51:8 139:80 11:93 7:87
80Korbach 80:32 6:82 52:7 5:77 80:07 6:82 7:85 5:77 0:173 9:1 0:20 39:40 39:40
81Kassel 222:80 28:81 56:4 28:03 222:80 28:81 11:45 17:85 0:056 3:2 0:02
82Eschwege 44:19 8:41 50:4 6:23 44:58 8:21 15:55 6:23 0:160 8:1 0:30 23:15 22:24 51:14 51:14 11:88 17:05
83Schwalm-Eder 69:09 9:86 55:4 9:20 69:71 9:31 11:78 12:00 0:083 4:6 0:11 11:79
84Hersfeld 60:89 6:18 56:5 14:17 60:89 6:18 9:21 12:37 0:081 4:6 0:12
85Marburg 109:82 9:52 58:3 1:77 109:10 9:52 8:03 1:76 0:567 33:0 0:48
86Lauterbach 42:74 5:02 49:7 11:14 43:24 5:02 10:39 11:14 0:090 4:5 0:19 6:47
87Fulda 110:97 8:79 54:8 ¡56:81 108:50 8:79 7:50 6:28 0:159 8:7 0:14
88Wetzlar 114:03 9:50 60:1 113:60 9:50 7:72
89Gie¼en 126:16 11:03 54:5 124:30 11:03 8:15
90Limburg 66:28 5:71 53:8 65:70 5:71 7:99
91Wiesbaden 229:22 16:53 68:0 226:60 16:53 6:80
92Frankfurt/Main1275:23 65:18 77:0 1250:20 65:18 4:96
93Hanau 159:76 13:82 63:2 159:00 13:82 7:99
94Darmstadt 208:03 13:46 60:7 208:03 13:46 6:08
95Erbach 36:61 3:32 52:0 36:20 3:32 8:41
96Altenkirchen 49:45 4:77 52:2 48:70 4:77 8:92
97Montabaur 87:95 6:45 50:0 85:00 6:45 7:06
98Neuwied 80:71 7:17 52:7 77:50 6:51 7:75
99Ahrweiler 46:02 4:08 47:8 184:17 44:50 3:98 8:21 52:50 0:019 0:9 0:04
100Koblenz 229:10 17:29 52:4 87:99 226:60 16:60 6:83 28:81 0:035 1:8 0:01
101Bad Kreuznach 62:42 6:77 51:0 44:39 62:42 6:77 9:79 41:67 0:024 1:2 0:03




























Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
103Cochem 29:14 2:09 42:0 75:78 29:14 2:09 6:70 75:78 0:013 0:6 0:04
104Simmern 48:71 4:22 49:3 26:29 46:30 4:22 8:35 26:29 0:038 1:9 0:08
105Trier 110:90 9:06 49:3 ¡1:52 109:50 8:98 7:58 10:35 0:097 4:8 0:08
106Bernkastel-Wittlich 50:29 3:95 46:5 41:27 49:70 3:95 7:37 41:27 0:024 1:1 0:05
107Daun 27:90 1:91 45:2 65:87 26:80 1:91 6:64 45:63 0:022 1:0 0:08
108Bitburg 36:06 2:81 51:7 40:88 36:00 2:81 7:23 35:81 0:028 1:4 0:07
109Kaiserslautern 141:80 16:69 53:5 15:30 139:07 16:69 10:72 15:30 0:065 3:5 0:04
110Landau 68:24 4:94 48:8 ¡117:03 63:80 4:94 7:19 2:50 0:400 19:5 0:58
111Mainz 221:81 12:46 59:9 210:60 12:46 5:58
112Alzey-Worms 74:88 8:33 55:8 38:11 73:20 8:33 10:22 37:92 0:026 1:5 0:03
113Pirmasens 73:12 9:46 50:0 11:50 73:12 9:46 11:46 11:50 0:087 4:3 0:11 8:67
114Ludwigshafen 270:73 21:52 62:0 270:73 21:52 7:36
115Germersheim 49:63 4:05 60:7 48:20 4:05 7:75
116Merzig 41:22 4:06 46:5 ¡3:51 40:90 4:06 9:04 3:10 0:322 15:0 0:72 12:61 1:60 2:13 12:61 12:61 0:32
117St. Wendel 34:23 2:78 57:1 ¡26:92 32:60 2:78 7:85 1:43 0:700 39:9 1:98
118SaarbrÄ ucken 369:76 36:11 47:6 ¡4:13 360:03 36:11 9:12 1:68 0:595 28:3 0:15 60:66 60:66 33:98 60:66 60:66 60:66
119Homburg/Saar 77:45 7:37 54:2 ¡4:01 77:10 7:37 8:73 3:43 0:291 15:8 0:34
120Stuttgart 1326:66 49:59 68:1 1312:90 53:69 3:93
121GÄ oppingen 108:56 4:67 56:9 109:60 5:37 4:67
122Heilbronn 235:51 11:31 64:6 225:10 11:60 4:90
123SchwÄ abisch Hall 153:21 6:23 55:6 147:50 6:48 4:21
124Tauberbischofsheim 70:90 3:13 49:2 70:90 3:16 4:27
125Heidenheim 63:73 3:99 60:6 63:73 3:99 5:90
126Aalen 146:85 8:96 55:3 144:30 8:96 5:85
127Baden-Baden 146:72 6:94 61:0 142:50 6:94 4:64
128Karlsruhe 390:78 20:07 62:2 387:10 20:07 4:93
129Heidelberg 319:20 19:98 59:9 306:00 19:98 6:13
130Mannheim 317:84 24:04 63:4 312:10 24:04 7:15
131Mosbach 62:56 3:73 54:3 61:70 3:73 5:69
132Pforzheim 145:98 8:32 55:3 145:10 8:59 5:59
133Calw 58:22 2:85 51:9 58:22 2:98 4:87
134Freudenstadt 59:66 2:53 55:8 58:30 2:53 4:16
135Freiburg 310:40 17:22 50:7 300:90 17:22 5:41


















Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
137Rottweil 70:91 2:19 56:9 69:90 2:88 3:95
138Villingen-Schwenningen 111:76 3:30 53:2 110:20 4:59 4:00
139Tuttlingen 68:41 2:50 57:0 66:10 3:05 4:41
140Konstanz 127:10 8:69 56:7 125:10 8:69 6:49
141LÄ orrach 98:04 6:56 57:5 97:30 6:56 6:32
142Waldshut 69:99 4:83 53:3 69:00 4:83 6:54
143Reutlingen/TÄ ubingen 234:73 9:72 53:5 224:60 11:20 4:75
144Balingen 86:88 4:52 55:8 88:00 5:20 5:58
145Ulm 249:00 12:28 59:3 242:20 12:28 4:82
146Biberach 85:84 3:86 59:5 85:20 3:86 4:33
147Friedrichshafen 100:14 4:59 61:5 97:20 4:59 4:51
148Ravensburg 137:15 5:10 57:4 134:90 5:17 3:69
149Sigmaringen 60:00 3:97 48:6 60:30 3:97 6:17
150Bad Reichenhall 45:67 3:22 50:9 47:40 2:96 5:87
151Traunstein 80:07 4:15 60:5 79:00 4:15 4:99
152Burghausen 57:07 3:66 74:4 55:60 3:63 6:13
153MÄ uhldorf 47:47 3:10 57:0 46:20 3:10 6:29
154Rosenheim 142:27 6:35 53:4 139:80 6:35 4:34
155Bad TÄ olz 92:61 4:47 54:3 91:00 4:47 4:68
156Garmisch-Partenkirchen 42:35 2:02 46:5 42:35 2:02 4:56
157Weilheim 57:08 2:39 54:7 56:50 2:39 4:06
158Landsberg 47:26 1:80 52:8 44:50 1:80 3:88
159MÄ unchen 1511:01 51:98 80:2 1484:90 51:98 3:38
160Ingolstadt 219:95 10:00 62:9 210:40 10:49 4:75
161Kelheim-Mainburg 47:66 2:89 52:1 46:50 2:89 5:85
162Landshut 99:62 5:35 55:3 98:10 5:35 5:17
163Dingol¯ng 57:13 1:93 53:5 53:80 1:93 3:47
164Eggenfelden/Pfarrkirchen 52:17 3:64 52:2 ¡18:63 51:20 3:64 6:64 0:51 1:946 101:6 3:55
165Passau 115:88 11:15 51:8 4:76 115:88 11:15 8:78 4:76 0:210 10:9 0:17 53:11 53:11
166Freyung 33:80 4:01 42:5 4:67 33:80 3:64 9:71 4:67 0:214 9:1 0:57 2:99 3:05 16:97 16:97 0:10
167Regen-Zwisel 36:41 3:47 44:7 57:46 36:41 3:47 8:71 57:46 0:017 0:8 0:04
168Deggendorf 58:29 4:01 53:6 ¡170:75 57:30 4:01 6:54 1:33 0:750 40:2 1:22
169Straubing 64:36 4:63 53:1 4:65 63:50 4:63 6:80 4:65 0:215 11:4 0:32




























Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
171Regensburg 186:30 10:75 61:8 180:70 10:75 5:62
172Schwandorf 67:08 4:37 51:5 ¡27:22 65:70 4:37 6:23 2:15 0:465 23:9 0:66
173Amberg 68:75 6:07 54:6 ¡66:72 68:75 6:07 8:11 1:12 0:890 48:6 1:19
174Neumarkt 57:02 4:08 53:2 55:00 4:08 6:90
175Weiden 70:67 5:18 52:1 ¡29:57 70:50 5:18 6:84 0:29 3:500 182:4 4:62
176Marktredwitz 66:79 9:48 50:1 ¡10:47 69:69 8:85 11:26 3:24 0:308 15:5 0:39 7:64 9:22 28:70 28:70 7:97
177Hof 75:85 10:97 52:0 0:09 79:01 9:63 10:87 0:55 1:815 94:4 2:05 5:31 5:31 1:60 2:48 5:31 5:31 0:29 2:73
178Bayreuth 95:98 7:74 55:4 95:98 7:74 7:46
179Bamberg 108:97 7:94 53:0 106:40 7:94 6:94
180Kulmbach 34:90 4:10 50:6 17:27 35:21 3:87 9:90 6:37 0:157 7:9 0:40
181Kronach 36:28 3:48 47:8 ¡11:86 36:57 3:48 8:69 1:77 0:565 27:0 1:41
182Coburg 74:05 6:12 55:9 ¡12:96 75:15 6:12 7:53 0:49 2:047 114:3 2:52
183Lichtenfels 36:05 2:68 47:1 36:05 2:68 6:91
184Erlangen 173:27 9:86 63:7 166:70 9:86 5:59
185NÄ urnberg 564:65 42:37 62:3 564:65 42:37 6:98
186Wei¼enburg-Gunzenhausen 41:29 2:98 50:7 41:29 2:98 6:73
187Ansbach 105:86 6:39 54:0 105:50 6:39 5:71
188Neustadt/Aisch 39:73 2:64 50:3 156:96 38:80 2:64 6:38 92:00 0:011 0:5 0:03
189Kitzingen 41:20 2:03 50:5 39:90 2:05 4:89
190WÄ urzburg 156:25 8:30 52:8 154:90 8:30 5:08
191Schweinfurt 92:16 5:02 55:7 ¡4:92 88:50 6:24 6:58 0:80 1:243 69:3 1:31
192Ha¼furt 40:06 2:57 51:8 ¡4:56 38:20 2:61 6:40 2:50 0:400 20:7 0:98
193Bad Neustadt/Saale 38:85 3:79 50:9 ¡1:16 38:85 3:79 8:89 0:72 1:381 70:2 3:24
194Bad Kissingen 49:84 4:21 48:5 1:32 49:84 4:21 7:78 1:31 0:761 36:9 1:41
195Lohr am Main 59:43 3:16 58:8 57:90 3:16 5:18
196Ascha®enburg 178:86 11:68 54:5 172:40 11:68 6:34
197DonauwÄ orth-NÄ ordlingen 66:50 2:81 55:5 65:50 2:81 4:12
198Dillingen 38:91 1:94 53:6 38:70 1:94 4:77
199GÄ unzburg 57:52 3:41 59:9 57:00 3:41 5:65
200Augsburg 298:31 16:63 59:0 297:40 16:63 5:29
201Memmingen 90:73 4:46 50:8 89:60 4:46 4:74
202Kaufbeuren 81:16 3:81 53:2 80:90 3:81 4:50
203Kempten 106:05 5:51 50:0 106:05 5:51 4:94


















Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
205Pasewalk 30:92 11:75 38:9 16:94 31:84 10:77 25:28 16:94 0:059 2:3 0:14 37:68 37:71 79:50 71:55
206Greifswald 68:71 19:68 38:4 15:37 68:71 17:75 20:53 19:79 0:051 1:9 0:06 6:98
207Stralsund 72:14 21:56 38:4 5:70 72:14 19:56 21:33 20:14 0:050 1:9 0:05 7:00 7:37
208Bergen 30:07 8:28 36:1 37:76 30:07 7:73 20:45 37:76 0:026 1:0 0:07 28:71
209Neubrandenburg 109:74 35:43 41:2 20:82 109:74 30:82 21:93 20:82 0:048 2:0 0:03 3:60
210Waren 27:04 9:47 40:3 3:00 27:04 8:13 23:10 6:55 0:153 6:1 0:43 53:24 53:24 7:92 11:87 27:08 29:26
211GÄ ustrow 40:05 14:13 47:7 13:32 40:44 12:45 23:54 13:32 0:075 3:6 0:14 24:62 31:38 66:06 63:82
212Rostock 140:59 31:45 50:2 13:55 145:21 31:44 17:80 13:55 0:074 3:7 0:04
213Wismar 57:58 17:20 43:9 20:28 57:58 16:40 22:17 20:28 0:049 2:2 0:07 22:43 3:49 49:39 1:72
214Schwerin 105:09 22:11 44:1 2:17 109:52 20:05 15:47 8:79 0:114 5:0 0:09 3:43
215Parchim 38:40 11:62 41:8 ¡2:18 38:40 10:24 21:05 4:83 0:207 8:7 0:43 49:42 49:42 3:23 9:29 49:42 49:42 22:70 26:58
216Berlin 1866:89 410:67 49:1 12:661882:46 355:28 15:88 12:66 0:079 3:9 0:00 348:92
217Brandenburg a.d. Havel 51:48 17:05 42:1 35:88 52:96 16:13 23:35 35:88 0:028 1:2 0:04 47:00
218Belzig 33:02 6:55 42:5 ¡11:35 31:43 5:53 14:96 6:10 0:164 7:0 0:44 33:73 33:73 33:73 33:73 8:21 10:67
219Cottbus 145:30 38:21 48:9 19:40 146:80 32:65 18:20 19:40 0:052 2:5 0:03
220Eberswalde 29:47 9:13 42:4 8:71 29:47 7:79 20:89 10:58 0:095 4:0 0:25 4:33 8:94 33:79 34:89
221Prenzlau 54:07 20:72 49:9 54:49 54:95 19:14 25:83 54:49 0:018 0:9 0:02 127:00
222Finsterwalde 44:48 18:18 42:9 6:44 44:48 15:46 25:80 7:84 0:128 5:5 0:21 121:21 27:90 38:74 61:20 66:44
223Frankfurt/Oder 141:05 35:67 45:4 8:96 141:05 32:27 18:62 8:96 0:112 5:1 0:06 46:03 21:32
224Luckenwalde 31:27 8:76 56:8 9:68 30:19 7:50 19:90 9:68 0:103 5:9 0:27 72:64 0:46 6:33 28:29 30:64
225Neuruppin 64:02 18:69 43:3 17:97 62:49 16:55 20:94 17:97 0:056 2:4 0:07 4:73 36:09 0:14
226Perleberg 31:67 11:39 43:9 9:63 34:36 11:15 24:51 9:74 0:103 4:5 0:23 20:72 27:46 52:73 54:95
227Senftenberg 43:28 22:20 41:2 40:89 50:27 19:19 27:63 40:89 0:024 1:0 0:04 167:31 23:12
228Salzwedel 35:02 10:05 45:0 36:56 35:38 9:71 21:54 36:56 0:027 1:2 0:06 12:39 29:47
229Stendal 48:20 17:07 44:8 32:53 50:90 16:11 24:04 32:53 0:031 1:4 0:05 61:70 24:83
230Burg 40:08 12:30 43:7 16:12 40:08 10:91 21:39 16:12 0:062 2:7 0:12 10:32 12:06 53:71 44:89
231Magdeburg 198:84 48:89 44:9 39:69 198:84 48:89 19:73 39:69 0:025 1:1 0:01
232Halberstadt 92:84 31:52 44:1 36:89 93:78 29:75 24:08 36:89 0:027 1:2 0:02 44:93
233Sta¼furt 33:04 14:79 49:6 17:38 35:32 13:69 27:93 17:38 0:058 2:9 0:12 66:17 67:09 109:83 99:48
234SchÄ onebeck 46:58 17:80 45:1 46:44 48:96 17:80 26:66 46:44 0:022 1:0 0:03 146:15
235Dessau 87:81 28:68 42:8 17:88 88:02 27:44 23:77 17:88 0:056 2:4 0:05 54:63 31:75 31:99
236Wittenberg 43:00 16:17 44:3 28:09 45:62 14:71 24:38 28:09 0:036 1:6 0:06 60:21 9:70 73:77
237Sangerhausen 54:96 22:92 43:4 28:99 57:30 20:96 26:78 28:99 0:034 1:5 0:04 124:77 25:77 76:03




























Table 3.1: 2004-forecast for German regions and optimal aid distribution (continued)











































































































Ths ThsThs.EURThs.EUR Ths Ths % Ths.EUR ThsMio.EUR %Mio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EURMio.EUR
239Bitterfeld 28:26 16:88 51:5 71:61 37:17 15:24 29:08 71:61 0:014 0:7 0:03 248:46
240Naumburg 133:04 48:52 49:1 22:43 135:90 42:14 23:67 22:43 0:045 2:2 0:03 40:75
241Erfurt 165:04 29:76 41:7 12:64 165:04 28:51 14:73 12:64 0:079 3:3 0:04
242Weimar 67:29 14:45 35:9 ¡1:33 66:67 13:40 16:74 6:75 0:148 5:3 0:18 90:52 90:52 19:18 27:97
243Gera 99:35 24:55 39:8 10:72 101:12 24:55 19:53 10:72 0:093 3:7 0:07 19:74 21:06 22:95
244Jena 98:74 15:99 44:5 19:53 95:59 15:99 14:33 19:53 0:051 2:3 0:05
245Suhl 50:58 12:13 40:5 5:56 50:58 12:13 19:34 6:04 0:166 6:7 0:26 73:24 73:24 8:94 73:24 73:24 26:93 33:19
246Eichsfeld 44:09 9:80 36:3 9:75 41:63 9:80 19:06 9:75 0:103 3:7 0:20 3:12 30:61 32:54
247Nordhausen 37:67 10:65 43:5 4:82 38:38 10:65 21:72 4:98 0:201 8:7 0:41 53:01 53:01 4:98 11:34 53:01 53:01 25:11 29:15
248Eisenach 78:76 16:71 37:2 4:98 78:76 16:71 17:51 7:63 0:131 4:9 0:14 127:45 4:50 23:34 34:45
249MÄ uhlhausen 49:48 10:40 37:0 4:46 49:17 10:40 17:46 4:82 0:207 7:7 0:35 50:17 50:17 1:86 50:17 50:17 16:59 21:94
250Sondershausen 32:54 12:28 39:9 8:01 32:54 12:28 27:40 8:01 0:125 5:0 0:28 27:39 33:67 54:87 57:78
251Meiningen 62:84 13:89 38:8 7:39 61:46 13:89 18:44 7:46 0:134 5:2 0:18 103:58 53:08 6:95 28:77 36:44
252Gotha 64:94 13:18 42:8 6:16 63:68 13:18 17:15 8:37 0:120 5:1 0:16 21:56 28:99
253Arnstadt 46:77 13:09 38:5 9:97 45:78 13:09 22:24 9:97 0:100 3:9 0:17 13:42 22:76 51:49 53:77
254Sonneberg 27:24 4:66 37:6 9:57 26:35 4:66 15:03 9:57 0:104 3:9 0:34 9:74 10:85
255Saalfeld 49:26 12:68 43:0 0:15 50:28 12:68 20:14 5:40 0:185 8:0 0:29 68:53 68:53 1:31 11:75 68:53 68:53 27:69 34:20
256PÄ o 41:55 10:37 41:2 ¡0:19 41:55 10:25 19:80 4:99 0:201 8:3 0:39 51:14 51:14 0:27 7:15 51:14 51:14 21:38 25:75
257Altenburg 39:58 14:67 39:7 8:38 39:58 13:58 25:55 8:38 0:119 4:7 0:22 25:43 33:84 57:54 61:17
258Leipzig 365:37 88:34 40:9 18:60 365:37 76:27 17:27 18:60 0:054 2:2 0:01
259Torgau/Oschatz 68:64 21:67 40:6 6:18 68:64 19:91 22:49 7:99 0:125 5:1 0:14 17:27 38:45 58:77 68:57
260Grimma 50:95 15:69 41:8 7:67 50:12 12:88 20:44 8:27 0:121 5:1 0:19 2:83 14:52 38:39 43:60
261Freiberg 87:50 29:38 38:1 8:58 89:04 26:64 23:03 9:40 0:106 4:1 0:09 29:21 60:67 71:80 80:77
262Chemnitz 236:48 61:16 41:9 4:87 246:40 56:67 18:70 6:54 0:153 6:4 0:05 370:64 370:64 173:93 268:39 67:37
263Annaberg 116:22 38:16 36:4 7:71 116:22 35:15 23:22 8:77 0:114 4:1 0:08 35:65 87:51 71:27 89:52
264Zwickau 108:17 29:15 44:4 12:39 107:92 26:56 19:75 12:39 0:081 3:6 0:06 14:97
265Plauen 109:04 28:66 39:2 7:81 109:04 26:34 19:46 7:81 0:128 5:0 0:09 15:90 36:44 33:87 55:37
266Dresden 341:10 63:01 43:8 ¡7:72 341:10 55:52 14:00 6:31 0:158 6:9 0:04 350:35 350:35 193:12 350:35 350:35
267Riesa 48:68 14:48 43:3 22:62 48:68 14:17 22:54 22:62 0:044 1:9 0:07 27:47 3:93 58:76 10:51
268Pirna 104:90 31:20 34:1 1:97 104:90 26:93 20:43 6:03 0:166 5:7 0:13 162:45 162:45 2:47 41:39 162:45 45:54 68:56
269Bautzen 147:62 47:54 40:1 12:75 147:62 40:67 21:60 12:75 0:078 3:1 0:04 5:13 48:77
270GÄ orlitz 62:88 22:16 34:8 17:06 62:88 19:91 24:05 17:06 0:059 2:0 0:07 48:68 38:82 80:45 44:43
271LÄ obau-Zittau 58:53 19:34 34:3 18:72 58:53 17:58 23:10 18:72 0:053 1:8 0:07 35:44 18:73 66:56 24:38
West Germany 32045.702531.20 59.2 31490.372520.09 7.41 282.66 282.66 282.66 282.66 775.60 1206.45 43.90 245.75
East Germany 7212.181897.13 44.0 7282.401717.64 19.08 1653.38 1653.38 1653.38 1653.38 1160.44 729.59 1892.14 1690.29
Whole Germany39257.884428.32 56.4 38772.774237.73 9.85 1936.04 1936.04 1936.04 1936.04 1936.04 1936.04 1936.04 1936.0430 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
Chemniz, and Dresden). In the given case it means at least 134 jobs for 1 Mio EUR
aid. In these regions the unemployment is eliminated completely, which corresponds
to full-height white gaps in the upper plot. The last subsidized region is 265 (Plauen)
where the threshold aid e±ciency 134 jobs for 1 Mio EUR aid is just attained. Here,
the almost exhausted aid su±ces to subsidize only a few jobs, resulting in a small
white gap in the upper plot.
This policy reduces the average unemployment by 3% and increases GDP by almost
11 Bio EUR. Only the taxes from this gain would not only cover the aid expenditures
B = 1653 Mio EUR but also contribute to the state budget. On the other hand,
the unemployment variance increases from 12.9 to almost 90%2, which is hardly
acceptable.
² The second model has the target weight ratio 0 : 1 : 0, reducing the consideration
to the second target GDP gain. The model also selects 15 of 67 regions, but now
with the best productivity-to-`job-cost' ratio. In the given case it means at least
5.2 Mio EUR of GDP gain from 1 Mio EUR aid (= better than 520%-returns).
The selected regions can be visually recognized in the second plot by the full-height
white gaps, meaning complete elimination of unemployment in the regions selected.
The threshold 520%-returns is attained in the 251th region Meiningen, where the
remaining aid is not su±cient to completely exhaust the unemployment (the white
gap is small).
The e®ect of this policy is very similar to the one obtained from the maximization
of employment discussed previously. The GDP gain and the average unemployment
are insigni¯cantly higher, by only 135 Mio EUR and 0.1%, respectively. The unem-
ployment variance is also almost the same, di®ering in 0:2%2. It is also remarkable
that 13 of the 15 regions selected coincide in both models. This means that pro-
ductive regions are `cheap' for grant-givers. Highly competitive industries
can create new jobs with little aid.
² The third model has the target weight ratio 0 : 0 : 1. The consideration is thereby
reduced to the third target Unemployment equalization. The model selects 41
of 67 regions with a high net unemployment (vector n) which reduction is still
a®ordable (vector d). The e®ect of the optimization is depicted in the third plot of
Figure 3.1, where the equalization is visually distinct.
The available aid su±ces to reduce the unemployment variance from 12.9 to 4.2%2,
On the other hand, this policy results in a rather modest decrease in the average
unemployment by only 0.8% and a contribution to GDP 3.1 Bio EUR (188%-return
from the aid).
Summing up what has been said, neither one-target model gives an acceptable solution.
Since the di®erence between models 1{2 and 3 is large, a combination of targets looks
most natural. A sample of compromise policy is provided by the fourth model illustrated






































GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
resulting from optimal aid distribution for 2004










































































































































































Total aid, in Mio. EUR
West Germany 283 283 283 283 283 776 1206 44 312 246
East Germany 1653 1653 1653 1653 1653 1160 730 1892 1624 1690
Whole Germany 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936 1936 193632 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS























Effect of Model with one target Minimal Unemployment for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% ®7.0%    GDP ­6.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%
2 ®8.5%
2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% ®16.1%    GDP ­10.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%
2 ®89.5%
2























Effect of Model with one target Maximal GDP Gain for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% ®7.0%    GDP ­6.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%
2 ®8.2%
2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% ®16.2%    GDP ­10.9 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%
2 ®89.3%
2























Effect of Model with one target Best Unemployment Equalization (Least Variance) for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% ®7.3%    GDP ­2.8 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%
2 ®4.5%
2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% ®18.3%    GDP ­3.1 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%
2 ®4.2%
2
























Effect of Model with Target ratio 2:1:7 for 2004
West Germany: Unempl.7.4% ®7.1%    GDP ­4.5 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.7.0%
2 ®4.8%
2
East Germany:  Unempl.19.1% ®17.1%    GDP ­7.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.12.9%
2 ®14.7%
2
Figure 3.1: E®ects of aid distribution with a separate budget for West and East Germany3.1. ONE-TARGET OPTIMIZATION 33























Effect of Model with one target Minimal Unemployment for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% ®8.8%    GDP ­20.8 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%
2 ®50.0%
2























Effect of Model with one target Maximal GDP Gain for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% ®8.8%    GDP ­21.0 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%
2 ®50.6%
2























Effect of Model with one target Best Unemployment Equalization (Least Variance) for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% ®9.4%    GDP ­7.6 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%
2 ®25.3%
2
























Effect of Model with Target ratio 2:1:7 for 2004
Whole Germany: Unempl.9.9% ®9.1%    GDP ­13.7 Bio.EUR    Unempl.var.41.7%
2 ®28.0%
2
Figure 3.2: E®ects of aid distribution with a joint budget for West and East Germany34 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
3.2 Multiple-target optimization
As seen from Table 3.2 and the fourth plot in Figure 3.1, the policy obtained for the
target weight ratio 2 : 1 : 7 is a real compromise between the policies determined by
single targets. It results in 17.1% unemployment which is by 1.0% more than under the
model with single target `Employment' but still 2.0% better than with no aid. Besides it
promises the gain in GDP almost 7.7 Bio EUR, which is 4.5 Bio EUR more than under the
equalization criterion only. On the other hand, the unemployment variance is 14.7% which
is clearly better than 90%2 under the optimization by employment or GDP criterion.
The only weakness of this solution is a minor increase in the unemployment variance
comparing with the net forecast for 2004, from 12.9 to 14.7%2, see Table 3.2. It does
not meet the destination of the aid, equalizing regional unemployment. The solution
can be easily ¯tted to this goal by adjusting the target weight ratio. Making the third
target 0.5 units `heavier' and running the model with weights 2:0.5:7.5, we obtain an other
optimal solution with the decrease in the unemployment variance from the predicted 12.9
to 11.7%2, see Table 3.2.
3.3 Triangle of priorities and target maps
The target weights a;b;c are too abstract decision parameters if they are not linked to
practical implications. The e®ect of target weights on the optimal East German regional
policy is displayed in Table 3.3 and in the associated Figure 3.3.
The triangle of priorities in Table 3.3 shows triplets of e®ects, national unemploy-
ment rate, GDP gain, and the regional unemployment variance for all combinations of
target weights to within 0.1. The target weights a;b;c are normalized in the sense that
a+b+c = 1, meaning that they are `the percentage of importance'. For instance, the cell
with target weights 0:2 : 0:1 : 0:7 lies at the intersection of the column indexed 0.1 and
row indexed 0.7. The cells with weights of the ¯rst target 0.2 lie at the diagonal indicated
by arrow stemming from 0.2 in the foot row of the table.
Consider the head element in the table cells, the national unemployment. It constitutes
a certain `relief' on the triangle of priorities. The map of this relief and the relief itself
are depicted in the upper section of Figure 3.3.
The middle elements in the table cells, GDP gain, constitutes another relief on the
same triangle of priorities. Its map and the relief itself are depicted in the middle section
of 3.3. Similarly, the bottom section of Figure 3.3 show the map and the relief of the foot
element of the table cells.
The maps and reliefs in Figure 3.3 illustrate the triple e®ect of moving over the triangle
of priorities. For instance, moving towards the vertex `Employment' implies a decrease in
the unemployment (upper relief), increase in GDP (middle relief) but an increase of the
unemployment variance (bottom relief).
The reliefs are not linear, and their increase or decrease are not directly conditioned
by each other. It gives a room for ¯nding compromises. For instance, a relatively low
unemployment and high GDP gain are compatible with a relatively low unemployment
variance.3.4. BUDGETING THE OPTIMAL REGIONAL POLICY 35
3.4 Budgeting the optimal regional policy
Usually decisions are made with respect to expected results under a certain budget °exibil-
ity. If the expectations are favorable then the initially intended budget can be somewhat
increased. If the predictions are pessimistic, the budget intended can be drastically cut.
Planning a regional policy is not an exception from this rule.
In principle one can predict the triple e®ect of the optimal regional policy for all
combinations of target weights and budgets. It is not however necessary, because the
e®ects from the optimization with target `Employment' or with target `GDP gain' are
very close. Therefore, it su±ces to retain only one of these targets and to scan over the
weight ratios Employment : Unemployment equalization, and over variable budgets.
Consider normalized ratios a : c, a+c = 1: Then c uniquely determines a, implying that
ratios a : c require one table dimension. Variable budgets require another dimension, and
we obtain Table 3.4. It is arranged similarly to Table 3.3, with cells displaying the triplet
e®ect of the optimal regional policy and, additionally an optional indicator. Besides, the
horizontal axis is now devoted to the total investment in the regional policy (= budget
constraint) and the table is not triangular, but rectangular.
Again, the ¯rst three elements of the cells determine three reliefs depicted together
with their maps in the associated Figure 3.4 These reliefs show which employment, GDP,
and equalization e®ects can be obtained from increasing the budget of the regional policy.
The fourth element of the cell, 'Pro¯tability', estimates the pure pro¯t of the state from
the regional policy.
For instance, suppose that the GDP e®ect from 1 Mio EUR aid is 3 Mio EUR. The
taxes from these additional 3 Mio EUR bring the state 39.1% tax (OECD estimation of
the tax ratio in Germany for 2001), or 1.173 Mio EUR. Then the pure `pro¯t' of the state
is 1:173 ¡ 1 = 0:173 Mio EUR, or 17.3%. These ¯gures constitute the fourth element
of the cells. Since the relief of the GDP exhibits decreasing marginal returns from the
budget increment, budgeting is getting no longer pro¯table beyond certain limits.
It should be noted that due to the linearity of our prediction model, the forecast is
getting less reliable as we deviate from some moderate policy. This means that neither
extreme ratios of target weights, nor very limited or, on the contrary, generous budgets
can be accurately processed by the model. Then the model results should be interpreted
rather as general trends.
3.5 Optimal policy for West and for whole Germany
The case of West Germany with a separate budget B = 282:66 Mio EUR aid and its
m = 204 regions, or the case of whole Germany with a joint budget B = 1936:04 Mio
EUR aid and totally m = 271 regions does not di®er essentially from the case of East
Germany discussed in detail. The e®ects of optimal regional policies are displayed in
the corresponding sections of Table 3.2. Their interpretation is similar to what has been
performed for East Germany.
The practical implications of target weights are shown in triangular Tables 3.5 and
3.7. Similarly to the case of East Germany, these tables are coupled with Figures 3.5 and
3.7, respectively. The ¯gures display the maps and reliefs of the optimization e®ects on
the triangle of priorities.36 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
Table 3.3:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
optimized on the triangle of priorities for East
Germany 2004
Equalization GDP priority
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Figure 3.3: The triangle of priorities with maps and reliefs of three target variables opti-
mized for East Germany 200438 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
Table 3.4:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
Pro¯tability, in %
under variable budget for East Germany 2004
Equalization Investment in regional policy, in Mio EUR
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Figure 3.4: Three target variables optimized under variable budget for East Germany
200440 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
Table 3.5:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
optimized on the triangle of priorities for West
Germany 2004
Equalization GDP priority
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Figure 3.5: The triangle of priorities with maps and reliefs of three target variables opti-
mized for West Germany 200442 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
Table 3.6:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
Pro¯tability, in %
under variable budget for West Germany 2004
Equalization Investment in regional policy, in Mio EUR
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Figure 3.6: Three target variables optimized under variable budget for West Germany
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Table 3.7:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
optimized on the triangle of priorities for whole
Germany 2004
Equalization GDP priority
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Figure 3.7: The triangle of priorities with maps and reliefs of three target variables opti-
mized for whole Germany 200446 CHAPTER 3. RESULTS
Table 3.8:
Unemployment, in %
GDP gain, in Mio EUR
Unemployment variance, in %2
Pro¯tability, in %
under variable budget for whole Germany 2004
Equalization Investment in regional policy, in Mio EUR
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Figure 3.8: Three target variables optimized under variable budget for whole Germany
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The budgeting is shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.8. They are also coupled with maps and
reliefs in Figures 3.6 and 3.8.
The most remarkable is the advantage of planning the regional policy for whole
Germany rather than for its West and East parts separately. The row in Table
3.2 devoted to whole Germany distinctly shows better e®ects in case of joint budget (in
full-sized font) than in case of separate budgets (in small font), even with respect to the
unemployment equalization. It should be interpreted as a hint to improve the guide-lines
for German regional policy.Chapter 4
Conclusions
4.1 Theoretical implications
1. (Operational equivalence of employment and GDP criteria) We have es-
tablished a high operational dependence of employment and GDP criteria. It is
explained by the fact that competitive branches with high productivity can create
jobs with little aid. Therefore, supporting competitive industries is the most e±cient
way of reducing unemployment. Thus, at the level of optimal planning employment
and GDP criteria are almost equivalent.
2. (Importance of equalization criterion) An extreme priority for unemployment
reduction (= economic development) implies an unacceptable variance of regional
unemployment rates. If implemented, this would destroy the regional structure,
cause uncontrollable migrations, etc. Therefore, equalization of regional unemploy-
ment should remain in focus. Besides, it guarantees the reliability of the model.
Disregarding the equalization criterion results in disproportions which lead away
from the domain where forecasts remain accurate.
3. (Reduction of three-dimensional criterion space to two dimensions) The
last two items mean that the real planning space is not triangular, with vertices
Employment, Economic Growth, and Regional Equalization, but a one-dimensional
segment with alternative vertices Employment (= Economic Growth) and Regional
Equalization. In other words, the planning triangle is folded into a segment.
4. (Negative consequences of `overequalizing' regions) Exaggerating the im-
portance of equalization is unfavorable for the competitive standing of the national
economy. For instance, attempts to quickly equalize East and West Germany by
subsidizing one at the price of not subsidizing the other turned out to have higher
social costs than expected. It reduced the competitiveness of German industry and
caused high unemployment. Generally, consideration of West and East Germany
jointly is more e±cient.
5. (Regional policy as a pro¯table enterprize) Besides direct e®ects on unemploy-
ment, GDP, and regional equalization, the model traces the returns from subsidizing
regions in the form of taxes on additional production due to additional jobs. It al-
lows to consider regional budgeting as a national enterprize and to evaluate it from
4950 CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSIONS
the viewpoint of pro¯tability.
4.2 Possible technical improvements
1. (Model °exibility) The bottle-neck of the model is the reliability of econometric
predictions and the accuracy of source data. Therefore, the model is designed to
import external data which can be more speci¯c or exhausting. Depending on data
and goals, the model can also be adjusted to other targets and constraints, or, for
instance, to another target year or period.
2. (Cross-e®ects from subsidizing neighboring regions) It is also possible to
approximately take account of e®ects from subsidizing neighboring regions. It can
be achieved by allowing the matrix D to contain elements other than on its main
diagonal (= which are decrements in the regional unemployment rates resulting
from 1 Mio EUR aid to the region). `Neighboring' elements to the main diagonal
of D serve for accounting the e®ect from subsidizing the neighboring regions in
the equation y = n ¡ Dx. It should be emphasized that in our case we can
consider at most six neighboring regions. Indeed, with eight years observations we
can determine the intercept, and 7 coe±cients associated with regions.
3. (Adding target variables) As for target variables, the model can incorporate, for
instance, the infrastructure index as the fourth target variable. Then the triangle of
priorities turns into a pyramid, the tables operate with quadruplets of e®ects instead
of triplets, and ¯gures will have four reliefs instead of three. The rectangular budget
table will turn into a three-dimensional `cubic' table.
4. (Adjusting restrictions) As for restrictions, the regional unemployment rate can
be limited, say, to 3% from the bottom. It will save a fraction of the budget
and channel the aid to the regions which otherwise receive no subsidies. Besides,
restrictions can be individually ¯tted to particular regions rather than to be equal
for all. For instance, Berlin as capital and Leipzig as candidate host of Olympic
Games can get some privileges.Chapter 5
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